



“SEMPER PROCINCTUM”

Always prepared for battle

This foldout is a summary. To fully understand the Design for Undersea Warfare requires a thoughtful reading of the source document.

How Ready Are We?

Over the past several months, the submarine force leadership has been asking itself, “What can we do to make the force better prepared for warfighting?”

What Did We Find?

Our answer is the “Design for Undersea Warfare.”



Where Do We Go Now?

Now we are unleashing the collective talent of our greatest asset—our dedicated and skilled **Officers and Sailors**—on this challenge.

Key Points on the Design

- Our Submarine Force remains a small, high performance team. Our sailors are the very finest, and as a team, we punch way above our weight.
- Our Navy is as busy as ever, and the pace is not expected to change. The demands on the force will likely increase as new capabilities emerge that can threaten our national interests.
- History has shown that in wartime our Submarine Force will be among the first to respond. We must be ready to fight on day one. Our actions will help enable the Navy team and other joint forces to get in the action—ensuring access.
- The maritime security environment has changed. We now face new weapon systems that can threaten our Joint forces at longer ranges. These challenges underscore the demands on the Submarine Force to meet our responsibilities.
- The fiscal challenges we face today are not going away. We must be judicious to ensure that we sustain a force with integrity and wholeness.
- The Design is about being laser-focused on what is important and getting rid of distractions. If we do not become better warfighters, we will have missed the target.

The Three Lines of Effort Are Unchanging

For more than a hundred years, the submarine force has sought ready forces, effective employment, and future force capabilities. We are likely to continue to seek those three lines of effort.

The Focus Areas Will Change

Focus areas can be the weaknesses we need to address or they can be opportunities that we should be taking advantage of. As we address one set of Focus Areas, we will move on to others. We will depend on the initiative and foresight of our people to recognize and bring to the proper attention the next generation of issues—we will always work to get better.

DESIGN FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE

Read the *Design for Undersea Warfare* document at: [http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/PDF/Undersea Warfare.pdf](http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/PDF/Undersea_Warfare.pdf)

Ready Undersea Forces
Provide undersea forces ready for forward operations and warfighting

Effective Undersea Force Employment
Conduct effective forward undersea operations and warfighting today

Future Undersea Forces Capabilities
Prepare for future undersea operations and warfighting

GOALS

Prepare undersea forces to safely and effectively complete **peacetime operations** directed by operational commanders.

Optimally **employ our undersea forces** independently or as part of a team in support of operational or warfighting responsibilities.

Define **the future role of undersea forces** in both operations and warfighting, mindful of the changing technology and security environment.

Prepare undersea forces to effectively conduct **wartime operations on short notice** as directed by operational commanders.

Reliably and professionally **accomplish the missions** tasked by the operational commanders while effectively managing risk and stealth.

Determine **platform, payload, payload volume, people and posture requirements**. Coordinate future missions with other warfare communities.

Develop and refine through experimentation the **command and control doctrine and TTP** for the Undersea Warfare Commander for manned and unmanned systems.

Be ready to go to war and immediately execute the combatant commander's direction.

Translate military requirements into **decisions, policy and funding**.

CURRENT FOCUS AREAS

Empower Submarine Commanding Officers
Shift the assessment center of gravity from the ISIC to the CO. Commanding Officers will be given more latitude to tailor the ship's schedule and FRTP, increasing the sea time available for discretionary use with fewer distractions.

Optimize Theater-Specific Force Employment
Improve engagement with the Combatant Commanders to encourage tailored, optimal employment of the limited undersea forces available. Educate combatant staffs on the full range and flexibility of undersea forces.

Evolve the Future Role of Undersea Forces
Leverage undersea concealment to counter expanding anti-access/area-denial environments. Advocate the capabilities uniquely provided by undersea forces to complement the goals of the joint force.

Sustain Warfighting Readiness
Revise policies to change the “assessment mindset” from external work-ups to sustained, internally driven warfighting readiness. Manning and maintenance policies will be reviewed to minimize lost availability.

Increase Deliberate and Planned Demonstrations of Warfighting Capabilities
Build multi-year demonstration plans that exercise warfighting capabilities. Integrate feedback with the preparation process, training doctrine and modernization plans.

Develop an Integrated Undersea Future Strategy (IUFS)
Procure submarine platforms and payloads in an informed and effective manner. Preserve undersea payload volume and develop manpower with the required skills and experience to support future undersea roles.

Develop Undersea Warfare Commander Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Formalize command and control of manned and unmanned undersea systems for full integration into broad Navy operations while preserving the military advantages of undersea stealth.

Improve Operational Availability of Forward Undersea Forces
Reduce mission degradation through enhanced reliability of existing systems. Improve at-sea repair and reback to maintain undersea forces at sea. Demonstrate forward repair and reload CONOPS to support stressed wartime postures.

Obtain Decisions to Address Warfighter Requirements
Ensure uninterrupted survivable nuclear deterrence through on-time delivery of the *Ohio* Replacement SSBN. Sustain *Virginia* class SSN construction and undersea payload volume. Support future large-diameter payloads.

OUR SHARED “SUBMARINE CULTURE”

Our people are the key to our success

Warfighting

We expect to operate and fight far forward, independently, “behind enemy lines,” for long periods of time, without support.

We maintain ourselves as ready as possible to leave soon, move quickly and be among the first to penetrate the enemy's defenses.

We depend on stealth, surprise, and boldness. We practice these every day.

We exploit concealment by the sea as a key to success, but respect that the same sea will kill us if unchecked.

We safeguard tactical information and avoid exploitable patterns.

We understand that operating undersea is inherently dangerous business and that only trained and vigilant individuals and teams will keep our ships and crew safe.

We know our potential adversaries and have operating experience in the environments that might become future undersea battlegrounds.

We understand “calculated risk” but avoid “unnecessary risk” by thinking ahead, anticipating risk and taking mitigating actions.

Readiness

We stay ready to operate far forward on short notice by managing manpower, training and maintenance to avoid fluctuating readiness.

We have small crews. Each person has multiple roles. All are responsible for the ship's safety, stealth and mission.

We have no peer in our aggressive approach to improvement through assessment and training.

We ensure that nobody is indispensable by building depth of expertise.

We depend on initiative, decentralized command, and teamwork.

We incorporate safety and effective work practices into our habits.

We depend on absolute integrity. We employ back-up and second checks, but each person remains individually responsible.

We comply with procedures, founded on technical understanding. We know and use the source requirements and references.

We candidly face the facts—good and bad—and proceed based on well-known standards that are based on thorough analysis.

We are resourceful. We always have a Plan B, and we can often fix the equipment even if we lack the parts.

We own our ships, taking meticulous care to maintain them in a state of maximum possible material condition—*ready to go to war*.

Enabling Success and Managing Risk

Our peacetime operational priorities remain unchanged:
Safety: Avoid collisions, groundings, damage, injuries, death.
Stealth: Remain undetected.
Mission: Accomplish the mission.

Our actions at sea and ashore are always professional:
We are ambassadors of the Nation. We act with the highest standards of conduct. We each set a powerful example to those around us.

Our collective warfighting skill will improve:
Warfighting inherently requires increased acceptance of risk. Accepting increased risk requires forethought and in-depth understanding of the assumptions we make to keep us safe. It is not enough for an individual or a crew to be prepared, we must as a Force be ready to fight on short notice.

Problems We Must Solve

Inspections: Our current approach to inspections and assessments rewards cyclic and temporary narrow excellence instead of excellence which is sustained and broad.

Inflexible Scheduling: Our TYCOM and ISIC efforts tend to limit a Commanding Officer's freedom and flexibility. Shared responsibility and accountability between the ship and the chain of command is limiting CO's ability to achieve success. Excessive administrative distractions are burdensome.

Fostering Initiative: We lose sight of the fact that warfare is a human-centric problem. Insufficient emphasis is given to developing creativity and initiative, both of which are essential to the decentralized command upon which effective undersea warfare is based.

Bureaucracy: Our solutions to problems can tend towards bureaucratic, process-dominated approaches.

“The Design for Undersea Warfare is a framework for action. Read it, think about it, discuss it and **act** on it.”